In reading the work, I was reminded of the writings of Douglas Southall Freeman, best known for his biographies of George Washington (Simon & Schuster, 1995) and Robert E. Lee (Scribner’s, 1991). Freeman gave a series of lectures at the Army War College and the Naval War College that I recommend to anyone who wants to understand leadership under stress and under truly consequential circumstances. After looking at the leadership traits common to these men and others he studied, Freeman summed up their leadership qualities in three tenets, which in today’s diverse world of military service would translate as follows: “Know Your Stuff,” “Do the Right Thing,” and “Look After Your People.”

Leadership and character are always important, but perhaps even more so now. There is a real thirst for national leadership—on both sides of the aisle—that citizens can feel proud of. This book proves that leadership is not limited to heroic seagoing assignments, even in the Navy. Stavridis highlights three examples in particular: Alfred Thayer Mahan, the visionary whose work on nuclear propulsion transformed the Navy forever; and Grace Hopper, the gifted mathematician and computer scientist who led the Navy into the computer age. These leaders demonstrated the kind of character—especially the dedication to national service—that Stavridis obviously admires.

Another context that makes this book timely is the dramatically changed media environment. Deliberate disinformation and the polarization of debate and discourse make it more difficult for citizens to distinguish factual information from false. The media environment is weaponized, and a casualty of this is a loss of faith in our leaders and our institutions. We crave the “essential sanity” that Freeman identified in George Washington. A malaise has set in—one that manifests itself in a trend of the best and brightest being discouraged from engaging in national service.

While its emphasis is on naval leaders, Stavridis’s book provides character and leadership insights that transcend things naval and are relevant to the joint warfighting community and joint professional military education. Indeed, it has lessons that extend well beyond the purely military realm. This gives Sailing True North a Freeman-esque quality and utility, and I recommend it to anyone who wants to understand the essential questions of character and leadership under stress. Jim Stavridis boils down the traits, the common threads. For each, the author provides examples from his own experience. At the top of his list of 10 key conclusions are creativity followed by resilience. The book makes readers think and challenges us to ask who our heroes are and what qualities they embody. Stavridis encourages us to self-examine as we make our voyage through life with all the tests of leadership and character that one will experience.

The author is supremely well read, and, as such, he provides an invaluable distillation of a vast span of history for easy assimilation. I found the style and the structure of the book easy to follow and enjoyable to read. Translating this history and these traits into specific, modern examples makes the book both an invaluable primer for new students of leadership and a stepping off point for those who want to delve deeper into specific historical subjects.

This book answers the question: What does Jim Stavridis think is most important? When the author is this well read, this well known, and himself served at the most consequential levels of command, that is a question worth answering. This makes it a recommended read—a must read. JFQ

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beyond an exhortation to expand our collective understanding of jointness, how does this actually work? Why is it so hard? Who is responsible for making it happen? Who works for whom? **Subordinating Intelligence: The DOD/CIA Post–Cold War Relationship** represents an important contribution to the body of literature on joint operations in this interagency context.

Other intelligence and non-intelligence organizations are important to military operations, but the Central Intelligence Agency is a particular case. In some recent instances, CIA was the only U.S. organization already operating in a region where the Department of Defense (DOD) was assigned a combat mission, as was the case in Afghanistan after 9/11. In noncombat zones, chiefs of station are tasked by the CIA director and the Director of National Intelligence with coordinating all intelligence operations in-country. CIA analysts guard their independence stubbornly, and commanders from William Westmoreland to David Petraeus have found themselves frustrated by the effect their analysis had on the civilian leadership’s framing of “their war.” Professional development often does too little to prepare rising officers to work with CIA in the field or at senior staff levels, with the recent exception of special operations forces.

**Subordinating Intelligence** is a well-written analysis of the evolution of the relationship between DOD and CIA in the post–Cold War era. One valuable contribution from this history is the identification of the barriers to cooperation, which pop up time after time in the various instances Oakley describes. A second contribution is the isolation of the factors that made a difference where integration was achieved. As implied in the title, however, Oakley’s book addresses another important and specific question. CIA was created to be an independent agency outside any Cabinet-level department and a strategic intelligence organization to serve the needs of the President and the National Security Council.

Oakley sees a threat to this mission based on the creeping militarization of U.S. foreign policy, including explicit and implicit demands that CIA be subordinated to a support role for DOD (despite its immense intelligence resources). An interesting quality of the book is that it is a Soldier—who understands the potential value of CIA capabilities when employing U.S. combat power—who articulates the potential costs of sacrificing its strategic collection and analytic responsibilities to DOD’s “infinite demands on a finite resource.” Oakley not only illustrates this “support-to-supported” tension for particular missions but also highlights instances where one side or the other fails to understand that their missions are actually different. He quotes a CIA officer describing the DOD’s expectation of tactical support in its “sprint” to leave Iraq, while the Department of State and CIA were tasked to focus their efforts on a “marathon” to support a stable Iraq. In his excellent concluding chapter, Oakley quotes Senator David Boren (D-OK) musing about the appropriate role for CIA in 2013 by asking, “In the long term, what’s more important, Afghanistan or China?”

While bringing this baked-in dilemma into stark relief, Oakley correctly resists the urge to prescribe bold legislative or executive remedies to resolve it. Yes, the CIA exists to collect strategic intelligence, to provide strategic analysis for the President and his key advisors, and to conduct covert action when lawfully ordered to do so. On the other hand, the CIA can bring unique capabilities to the fight and can contribute to the “rich contextual understanding” (as General Stanley McChrystal described it) required for success on complex battlefields. It would be folly either to subordinate CIA to supporting warfighters or to preclude its assistance when Americans are shedding blood. The chapters between the introduction and the conclusion offer examples and practical principles for building effective teamwork and avoiding these draconian choices, while taking advantage of all available capabilities.

Both military and intelligence professionals would be well served to read this excellent book to find examples of what can go wrong, but also what can go right. Consistent with organizational theory, Oakley records instances of interagency conflict, or “storming,” which in turn led to “norming,” which led to jointly “performing” the mission. His cases show that this process occurred much faster on the second and third attempts. They also highlight that the importance of personal relationships—often forged by shared danger—speak to the necessity for liaison officers, and offer examples of what can happen when mutual respect for the ethos of other organizational players in the shared operational space results in deep trust. The historical examples seem to indicate that this process can be accelerated, but not replaced, by reorganization or imposed process.

Interagency alignment is a prerequisite for success. Oakley’s book is a model for more that needs to be written—on DOD and State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and CIA, U.S. Aid and DOD, and so forth. I highly recommend his book.

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